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Cyber security threats have rapidly developed in recent years and should also be 
considered when building or implementing systems that traditionally have not been 
connected to networks. More and more these systems are getting networked and 
controlled remotely, which widens their attack surface and lays them open to cyber 
threats. This means the systems should be able to detect and block malware threats 
without letting the controls affect daily operations. File integrity monitoring and 
protection could be one way to protect systems from emerging threats. 
 
The use case for this study is a computer system, that controls medical device. This kind 
of system does not necessarely have an internet connection and is not connected to a LAN 
network by default. Ensuring integrity on the system is critical as if the system would be 
infected by a malware, it could affect to the test results. 
 
This thesis studies what are the feasible ways to ensure system integrity on limited 
environment systems. Firstly these methods and tools are listed through a literature 
review. All of the tools are studied how they protect the system integrity. The literature 
review aims to select methods for further testing through a deductive reasoning. After 
selecting methods for testing, their implementations are installed to the testing 
environment. The methods are first tested for performance and then their detection and 
blocking capability is tested against real life threats. 
 
Finally, this thesis proposes a method which could be implemeted to the presented use 
case. The proposal at the end is based on the conducted tests. 
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ACSS  A posteriori computer security system 
AD  Active Directory 
API  Application Programming Interface 
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LOLBAS Living Off the Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries 
LTSB  Long-term Servicing Branch 
MBR  Master Boot Record 
OS  Operating System 
OVA  Open Virtual Appliance    
RAT  Remote Access Trojan 
RCE  Remote Code Execution 
PCR  Platform Configuration Register 
RIM  Registry Integrity Monitoring 
SGX  Software Guard Extensions 
TLS  Transport Layer Security 
 
TPM  Trusted Platform Module 
UAC  User Account Control 
VBS  Virtualization-based Security 
WMI  Windows Management Interface
 
1 Introduction 
Malicious programs (malware) are increasing vastly and getting better to hide from the 
system. [1] At the same time, number of internet connected devices, or Internet of Things 
(IoT), is going up [2]. The digitalization enables modern and efficient way to handle 
business which is necessary for modern operations. Because of this, different industry 
sectors are adapting automation and remote access in their processes which increases the 
attack surface. Based on Zscaler report [3], number of IoT malware attacks rose 700% at 
the beginning of COVID-19 pandemic. To protect IoT systems from malware, the 
systems must have malware protection. This master’s thesis tries to find feasible way to 
protect IoT systems against malware without consuming all of their limited resources. 
 
1.1 Context 
In addition to the rising volumes of attacks, the attackers are also getting more 
sophisticated. Majority of attacks are opportunistic but there are targeted ones as well. 
For example Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) work until they get in to the networks 
and then just lay down and observe before they are try to achieve their objectives [4]. The 
objectives of APTs and opportunistic attackers can be anything from stealing information 
to ransomware attack or affecting data integrity on the target system. Good example of 
an attack that affected data integrity is a security incident that occurred in Oldsmar, 
Florida, February 2021 [5]. An unknown attacker was able to alter the level of lye in water 
purification process. Basically a water purification system was intruded and level of lye 
was raised more than a hundredfold. The attack could potentially have affected infection 
for lot of people living in the area of the water purification. In this case the incident was 
detected by a human operator and the security mitigations were executed. 
 
The modern way to install malware does not require the threat to be present on the file 
system. The malware can for example be delivered to the system by exploiting a remote 
code execution (RCE) vulnerability. If RCE vulnerability is exploited, attacker may load 
malicious shellcode directly to the memory. This leaves no files on the disk and the 
technique is called fileless malware [6]. Another way to deliver fileless malware would 
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be using a malicious website or malicious document that includes a script that downloads 
the malware and injects it directly to the system memory. It is good to understand that 
malware either succeeds in execution or hiding, not both, which enables the defenders to 
detect and block the malware execution if it is attempted [6].  
 
Traditionally, to protect the system from malware, execution of the malicious program 
must be prevented. The traditional anti-virus (AV) solutions are primarily based on 
behaviour, malware signature, or known application detection, as shown in the Figure 1 
[7]. These methods are efficient and fast in detecting known malware but extremely bad 
in detecting new, modern malware. [1, 7] As the malware and attacker tools, techniques 
and procedures are evolving, malware defences need to evolve too. Due to this reason, 
lot of anti-virus software vendors have also shifted their focus from prevention to 
detection [8]. These software are called endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools. 
The tools have integrated incident response capabilities to provide threat hunting 
capabilities and opportunity to block and detect malware. EDR also provides 
investigation capability to humans monitoring the EDR management console [8]. To 
detect anomalies in the monitored system, EDR may do behaviour monitoring to the 
system and flag suspicious behaviour [7]. Example of suspicious behaviour could be 
document editing software Microsoft Word executing Windows Command Prompt. This 
behaviour is common for malicious macros that are embedded to a word document. 
Fileless malware can achieve persistent on the system by adding malicious code to 
registry keys, Windows Management Interface (WMI) or scheduled tasks. Traditional 
anti-virus approach does not detect persistent mechanisms [7]. EDR also tracks down user 
and system activity, which includes logging file changes and system API calls. By 
logging file changes and API calls, the analyst monitoring the EDR can identify attacks 
modifying system files and launch incident response process. [7] The problem with EDR 
is that they provide high volume of false alarms and lack of capability to prevent new 





Figure 1. Traditional anti-virus approaches [4] 
 
As the EDR requires active monitoring, it is not suitable for all use cases. For example in 
environments where IoT device manufacturer delivers a device and the customer does not 
have any access to it, EDR agents cannot be installed on it and the customer will not get 
any data out of the system. In these cases the manufacturer should ensure cyber security 
resilience by implementing preinstalled controls. One of the ways to secure the system is 
to monitor and ensure file system integrity. File system integrity means that the 
configuration information, user data, executable programs and the operating system itself 
is not altered or corrupted [9]. For example, the protected information can be a database 
where the healthcare system loads it values for verifying blood results. If the reference 
data is corrupted by malicious change, the outcome could be fatal. Operating systems 
store their configuration to disk and load it to the memory on a start-up. The configuration 
can be altered on the memory, which sets requirements for protecting the system memory 
as well. The memory integrity can be established by isolating processes within containers 
[10]. This way processes are not able to write other processes' memory blocks and affect 
their integrity. This thesis tries to identify methods that establish integrity on the device. 
These methods should include preventive controls and not require active monitoring. 
 
Integrity can be monitored and ensured on multiple different layers. When verifying 
integrity on an operating system, the verification can be done by verifying for example 
Basic Input-Output System (BIOS) integrity, Master Boot Record (MBR), Operating 
System (OS) loader or the OS image itself. As the goal of this thesis is to ensure OS 
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security when it is running on an IoT system, the research focuses on the file system and 
the memory integrity. File system integrity means that wholeness of the files stored on 
the file system are being monitored and protected for malicious changes. This includes 
also all operating system and software configuration files. Memory integrity means that 
the process memory is isolated from other processes by using containers. Some of the 
operating system configuration resides in the memory until the system is turned off. 
 
File integrity monitoring (FIM) is a relatively old thing as McKosky et al. [11] have 
already considered it as a solution for malicious programs in 1990. They have identified 
need for a software that protects the computer from malware with own automatic-
countermeasures. McKosky et al. define a posteriori computer security system (ACSS) 
that maintains a database of files and detects if there are changes. The operating model of 
ACSS is similar to what is still used in the modern solutions [12]. Securing operating 
systems for file integrity is not however easy [13]. For example Windows attack surface 
is large and lot of different binaries get loaded and executed subsequently. Software also 
gets updated and new software is installed which produces lot of changes on the file 
system. As the system changes continually, ensuring the file system integrity is hard. 
 
IoT systems are like any information technology (IT) systems [14]. They run on similar 
components and do similar tasks. IoT systems have usually limited resources as the 
assembly costs are kept as a minimum. Because the system is not the core product of the 
entirety and the development of the system might take time, parts might be obsolete when 
compared to the newest technology. The CPU can for example have limited processing 
power, the system can run low on memory, the storage size can be limited, or all of these. 
The systems are often also built to have long time support without need of hardware 
upgrades. Example of this kind of system could be factory automation controllers. The 
system plays critical part of the process in the example and cannot be easily replaced 
because it would cause a long maintenance downtime. Securing such device with limited 
resources can be challenging. The systems might have not been built with security by 
design and the resources that security software needs might not be calculated when the 




1.2 Goal of thesis 
Purpose of this thesis is to find feasible integrity assurance method for IoT system. On 
the operating system level IoT systems are similar to regular IT systems - they are often 
running the same operating systems as the IT systems are. Some of the systems run on 
Linux or UNIX operating system, while the others use Windows. The target system of 
this research is a Windows 10 IoT Enterprise 2015 LSTB operating system running on 
x64 architecture. The Windows 10 is used in many IoT systems and majority of malware 
is targeted against Windows machines [15]. Operating systems and the software running 
on it require updates. In IoT systems the updates are often delivered only when new 
features or significant fixes are pushed to the system. This means the updating frequency 
is not as short as it is in regular IT systems. However, the system needs to be updated 
which is why the chosen method needs to allow the operating system and the software to 
be updated. 
1.3 Research methods 
The research is executed through empirical and literature research. First available 
methods are researched from existing academic work and compared together. After the 
available methods and their possible implementations are listed, the most feasible 
methods are selected by deductive reasoning. The deductive process follows the research 
questions. 
 
Next the identified methods and their implementations are tested in practice through 
empirical research. The tools are installed to the testing environment. In order to identify 
feasible method for ensuring integrity in a limited environment system, performance of 
the methods are tested by measuring how much resources they require from the system. 
After measuring the performance, the tools are tested against real life threats. Purpose of 
the second test is to identify which kind of threats the selected methods are able to detect 
and block. 
1.4 Use case 
This master’s thesis is researching methods to ensure system integrity on Windows 10 
2015 LTSB x64 system, as shown in the Figure 2. 64-bit system was chosen because the 
modern software has wider support for 64-bit systems and the architecture does not limit 
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amount of memory. In 32-bit systems CPU can only use 32 bit long memory addresses. 
2³² bytes is equal to 4294967296 bytes, which is 4 GB. This is the reason why x86, or 32-
bit, processors can typically use only 4 GB of memory while the x64 systems can 
theoretically use up to 16 EB, or 16 000 000 TB, of memory [16]. 
 
The researched methods should preferably work as a standalone local installation or 
without continuous connection to a server. The target system is used in a local network 
where necessarily is no direct internet access. The integrity monitoring method should 
allow updates on the target system and software but still ensure no malicious changes are 
made. Detecting malicious changes from genuine ones is one of the key functions. The 
chosen method should not hinder the system performance. 
 
 
Figure 2. Computer information of the target system 
1.5 Research questions and structure of the thesis 
Related academic work is often focused on a single solution or examining theoretical 
models that could solve the issue instead of providing concrete solutions. This thesis 
compares feasible methods through literature research and introduces methods that are 
suitable for the use case. Limited environment systems are at a risk for similar threats as 
workstations and servers. The systems might get infected for example by Remote Access 
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Trojans (RATs) or a ransomware. Before researching the available integrity methods, 
threats that could affect the target system are presented in the Chapter 2.  
 
As introduced in the Section 1.1, file system integrity means that no malicious 
modifications are allowed on system configuration and files, while the memory integrity 
protection protects the running software from getting code injections on the runtime. 
Available methods for protecting Windows 10 system and memory integrity are listed 
and compared through deductive reasoning process. These methods are introduced in the 
Chapter 3. The literature research for available methods defines the Research Question 
RQ1. 
 
RQ1: What are available methods for ensuring file system integrity in Windows 10 while 
allowing controlled updating of the software? 
 
After identifying feasible methods for the use case, performance of the feasible methods 
is compared running them on a simulated IoT system. IoT systems do not usually have 
extra resources for running other software than the one they are built for. Because there 
are no resources on hold, the chosen method for ensuring integrity must use low resource 
on the system. The methods can use some of the resources but they should not have impact 
on system performance. This research answers the Research Question RQ2. Chosen 
methods from the Chapter 3 are tested on the limited resource reference system and the 
outcome of the study is presented in the Chapter 4. The RQ2 explores performance 
impacts of the feasible methods. 
 
RQ2: How do the feasible methods effect the system performance? 
 
If a feasible method does not have significant effect on the system performance, its 
security aspect should be verified as well. The chosen method should protect the system 
against modern threats, including the fileless malware discussed in the Section 1.1. The 
virtual system running the feasible protection method is infected with several threats and 
observed if the method is capable defending the system. Before testing if the method is 
capable to detect and block modern threats, the threats have to be identified. Chapter 2 
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focuses on identifying threats that could target limited environment systems. After the 
threats are identified, the target system is infected with the identified threats. The empiric 
research process and its results will be presented in the Chapter 5. The research answers 
to Research Question RQ3. 
 
RQ3: Can the chosen method detect and block modern threats? 
 
The goal of the thesis is to make as cyber resilient Windows 10 2015 LTSB system as 
possible, without sacrificing too much performance. The identified threats against the 
system are presented in the Chapter 2.  The researched methods and their implementations 
are presented in the Chapter 3. The performance issues are considered in the Chapter 4 
and the capability to defend against threats are researched in the Chapter 5. Chapter 6 is 
a conclusion chapter which also summarizes the research. 
1.6 Limitations  
Perfect security does not exist and there is no one solution to solve all of our cyber security 
problems [17]. The chosen method will not protect the system from all threats. Building 
cyber security defense is a constant race between defenders and attackers. When the 
defenders build new defense mechanisms, the attackers will adapt and find their way 
around the mechanisms. When the attackers develop new attack vectors, the defenders 
need to evolve their defense mechanisms. One of the ways to defend against threats is to 
build defense with defense-in-depth approach [18]. Defense-in-depth means that multiple 
security controls are implemented on different layers of the system or the network, these 
defenses could for example be security policies, perimeter security controls, network 
security controls, endpoint security controls, application security controls and data 
security controls [19]. The solution for protecting the system integrity will only be part 
of the endpoint security controls, where it defends the system from malicious changes. 
The core idea is to ensure defense even though one control fails to defend against the 
current threat. The core idea of the defense-in-depth is presented in the Figure 3. As the 
tests are executed on a virtualized device, the results may vary in a real environment. 






Figure 3. The Fan™ illustrating technology and process defense in depth architectural 
pictorial view. [20] 
 
The target system is Windows x64 operating system. There are many other architectures 
than x64 and operating systems than Windows that are used in the critical infrastructure 
systems. These operating systems and architectures were intentionally left out from this 
thesis. The research does not consider Linux or UNIX based operating systems or ARM, 
MIPS and other than x64/x86 architectures. 
 
Intrusions usually follow a process called the cyber kill chain [21]. The intruders start the 
attack with reconnaissance. The goal is to detect the system and identify weaknesses, 
which can be used to compromise the system. After deciding the attack vector, the 
attacker prepares payload which they will then deliver to the system. The payload will 
get executed and installed on the system after delivery. The attack might continue to the 
post-exploitation phase where the attacker starts to move laterally and work towards their 
ultimate goal. The ultimate goal can for example be cyber espionage, altering system data 
or ransomware attack. The thesis researches integrity assurance which will affect mainly 
on exploitation and post-exploitation phases of the process. The intrusion part is not 
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covered in this thesis and the goal is not to find attack vectors or vulnerabilities to exploit 
the system.  
 
The outcome of the research cover the whole operating system integrity by including 
memory integrity in the research. Files that are not accessible while the operating system 
is running are not in the scope. Some of the integrity protection methods are built for 
cloud base IoT systems. As this thesis processes only IoT devices running on bare metal, 
some of the solutions are out of scope. In the use case, the system is a standalone system 
and client-server architecture is not suitable for it. This sets certain limitations for 
available solutions and the products that require client-server architecture cannot be 
implemented. The system integrity can also be verified when the operating system is 
booting up by reviewing all images from Basic Input-Output System (BIOS) to operating 
system. This thesis focuses on running operating system so the BIOS and boot sector 




2 Potential threats 
Before evaluating feasible methods for system integrity, it is reasonable to identify 
potential threats that can threaten the system. This chapter identifies several potential 
threats and how they may affect the system integrity. 
2.1 Information stealers and Command and Control 
Information stealers are type of malware that are intended to collect information from the 
target system, allow attackers to connect the target system remotely, and to download 
more payloads from the attacker’s infrastructure [22]. The information stealers can be 
also categorized as downloaders, droppers, Trojans, Remote Access Trojans (RATs), and 
keyloggers [23]. Downloaders and droppers are type of malware, that deliver another 
binary to the target system and their only target is to execute it. Trojan is basically a 
synonym for information stealer as its actions can include deleting, blocking, modifying, 
and copying data. [24] Keylogger is a type of software, which records users’ keyboard 
and mouse activity, and reports them to the attacker. Keylogging is efficient way to 
achieve plaintext credentials from the target system. There are multiple different 
information stealers publicly available but based on Poston [25], the most common ones 
in 2019 were FlawedAmmyy, Quasar, PhoneSpector, AndroRAT, and Havex.  
 
The information stealers try to establish persistence on the target system by using multiple 
methods. For example information stealer Emotet can create random services, load 
custom DLLs, and add registry values for auto-start, which makes it hard to be fully 
removed from an infected system [22]. Common sequences of information stealer 
infection are leakage of confidential information, like passwords, and violated user 
privacy. [23] This means that information stealers mainly focus on affecting data 
confidentiality instead of integrity. However, the persistence methods affect system 
integrity as well and because of this information stealers can be considered as part of the 
potential threats in the thesis use case. 
 
To maintain persistence and to operate more easily, attackers tend to deliver command 
and control (C2) tools using the RATs. [25] C2 establishes the attacker to move laterally 
in the target organization, exfiltrate information, and for example to launch ransomware 
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attack more efficiently. Basically the target system has a beacon or an agent running, 
which contacts to the C2 server in the internet. The attacker can then establish a 
connection from the C2 channel and achieve shell connection to the target system. The 
common C2 frameworks are Metasploit and Cobalt Strike [26]. Finnish information 
security company F-Secure has released open source C2 framework called Custom 
Command and Control (C3) [27]. The tool allows safely red and purple teams to perform 
and demonstrate C2 capabilities. 
 
2.2 Ransomware 
Ransomware is a malicious software, which intends to lock the target machine either by 
altering system login, or by encrypting data [28, 29]. After successfully locking the 
system, ransomware demands ransom from the victim to unlock the system [29]. Based 
on Šulc [30], ransomware also steals sensitive information from the target systems to 
press the victim to pay the ransom. The threat groups behind ransomware attacks say that 
if the victim does not pay, the sensitive data will be leaked to the public or the data will 
be sold on Darknet to the highest bitter. This way the threat group receives payment from 
the attack and the victim will suffer from the leak of the sensitive information. 
 
Typically ransomware encrypts files on the system, which causes lot of file system 
operations [31]. The ransomware iterates target file types by their extensions and then 
encrypts the files either partly or fully. Full encryption takes more time, which is why 
many ransomware has changed to partial encryption [32]. Encrypting files affects 
significantly system integrity and availability, while stealing the information violates 
system confidentiality. However, ransomware is big threat for system integrity if it is 
allowed to execute in the target system.  Ransomware may also delete some backups from 
the target system. On Windows system, ransomware often calls vssadmin.exe to delete 
Windows volume shadow copies [33]. Also deleting the backups causes lot of file system 
operations and affects the system integrity by deleting good copies of affected files. 
 
Finnish information security company Fraktal has created a tool for testing ransomware 
protection. The tool is called Fransom and the term comes from Fraktal’s Ransomware 
Emulator [34]. The tool can be used to emulate common ransomware functions for testing 
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different endpoint protection tools, like endpoint detection and response (EDR). The tool 
is not designed to be destructive but running it on a production system is not 
recommended due the potential issues it might still cause for the target system. Based on 
the description on GitHub, the tool seems to be good for controlled testing if malware 
execution is prevented by the integrity protection methods. 
 
2.3 Fileless malware 
Fileless malware uses trusted and legitimate processes for execution [35]. These 
processes can for example be executed from Windows built-in internal binaries, which 
are called Living off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) in cyber security terms. 
The core idea of fileless malware is that they do not download malicious binaries or write 
them on the disk [35]. Example of fileless malware execution could be a spear phishing 
office document, which has embedded malicious macros that creates malicious WMI 
object. This WMI object then executes the malicious payload, which is often written in 
PowerShell and which injects the malware directly to system memory [7]. 
 
Fileless malware can be divided into four categories: code injection, script-based attacks, 
living of the land attacks, and fileless persistence [7]. Code injection can be established 
through several different techniques. Shellcode injection means that malicious code is 
injected to the legitimate process. In buffer overflow remote code execution (RCE) 
vulnerabilities, shellcodes can be used to execute commands on the target system or to 
establish more responsive connection from the system to the attacker [36]. DLL injections 
are type of attacks where attacker replaces path of the legitimate DLL file with their own 
that contains malicious code [7]. Reflective DLL injection is similar to shellcode 
injection: instead of writing shellcode into the process memory, loaded legitimate DLL 
will be replaced with attacker’s malicious version [37]. In process hollowing, attacker 
creates a process and suspends it. Before continuing the process execution, attacker 
replaces memory section of the process with their malicious code. From process list 





If fileless malware uses MSHTA, Wscript, PowerShell, or any other scripting engine to 
inject the malicious payload directly to memory, the technique is called script-based 
attack [7]. Script-based attacks often start from malware spam email messages, where 
malicious office documents or other files containing malicious scripts are attached to the 
message and delivered to victim. When the victim is lured to open and execute the 
document, malicious script will execute and load the payload directly to memory. After 
this the original carrier file can be destroyed by the malware leaving no trace of execution 
for the victim. [7]  
 
LOLBAS are Windows binaries, scripts, and libraries that can be used for malicious 
purposes [38, 39]. LOLBAS is wider term for LOLBins, which refers only to Windows 
binaries, which can be used for malicious purposes [35]. To be called a LOLBAS, 
Windows binary, script, or library must fulfil LOLBAS criteria [39]. Based on LOLBAS 
project criteria, the binary, the script or the library, which is categorized as LOLBAS, 
must either be able to execute code, compile code, do file operations, establish 
persistence, bypass Windows User Account Control (UAC), steal credentials, dump 
process memory, spy users, evade or modify logs, or do DLL side-loading/hijacking [39]. 
List of available LOLBAS’ is long. For example regsvr32.exe can be used to execute 
local or remote SCP scripts, and msbuild.exe can be used to build and execute C# projects 
[38]. 
 
Malware that is directly execute to the memory, must maintain its configuration somehow 
on the system to survive system reboot. Persistence mechanisms for fileless malware are 
similar to regular malware but instead of loading the malware from file system, the 
malware configuration is stored to the persistence mechanism [7]. Malware can store its 
configuration for example to Windows registry, scheduled tasks, or WMI services. These 
persistence methods effect on system integrity by adding malicious code to legitimate 
configuration files. When the malware is executed and persistent on the memory, the 





3 Methods for ensuring integrity 
This chapter introduces different methods identified through literature research and 
compares their capabilities against each other. 
3.1 File integrity monitoring 
One way detect changes in the file system is to monitor and ensure operating system and 
software integrity. File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) is a term for monitoring file integrity 
on a file system. FIM tools do not necessarily have capability to protect the system from 
integrity changes. Based on Peddoju et al. [13] FIM tools are also referred as file integrity 
tools (FITs). 
3.1.1 Types of File Integrity Monitoring 
3.1.1.1 Periodic File Integrity Monitoring 
Periodic File Integrity Monitoring (PFIM) tools compare attributes of the files existing in 
the file system to previous snapshot. The attributes are compared to previously generated 
database or snapshot of the file system. Based on Jin et al., these attributes can for 
example be cryptographic hash of the file, owner of the file, file content and file 
timestamps [40]. PFIM checks the system periodically and does not monitor system 
integrity in real time. Periodical check could for example done in the system startup. Jin 
et al. argue that hardware level PFIM checks, like Trusted Platform Module (TPM), are 
hard to bypass for an attacker [40]. 
3.1.1.2 Real-time File Integrity Monitoring 
Based on Jin et al., [40] Real-time File Integrity Monitoring (RFIM) based tools intercept 
operating system API calls and protect the system real-time by blocking calls that would 
harm the system integrity. RFIM requires kernel level access on the system. This access 
is permitted by installing kernel module on the system. Using kernel modules allows 
attackers to bypass the integrity monitoring by using kernel rootkits. Most commonly 
kernel rootkits are kernel modules as well and because they have the same level of access 
to the system, Li et al. [40] argue that attacker can hide the kernel module from RFIM 
and stay stealthy. 
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3.1.2 File Integrity Tools for Microsoft Windows 
File Integrity Tools (FITs) are special software made for integrity monitoring. Purpose of 
the software is to detect any file changes on the file system and prevent malicious 
activities. FITs can also be used to detect file access and trigger alerts for it [13]. Based 
on Peddoju et al. [13] FITs are not perfect for ensuring security as they have delay in 
detection, are complex to deploy, require lot of maintenance and lack information about 
the scope of the attack and overall visibility to the system. 
 
Peddoju et al. [13] also argue that the FITs can have challenges in compatibility, 
scalability and securing storage of the database. The use case in this thesis considers only 
Windows systems the compatibility issues will not be a problem for the scope of the 
research. Also scalability will not be a problem in single system implementations. 
Ensuring availability, integrity and security of the database is however something that 
should be addressed. If an attacker has access to database the FIT is using, they may set 
the policies so that their own tools can be executed  in the environment. 
 
Peddoju et al. [13] have divided FITs in three different operating categories: tools that 
run in the user mode of the operating system, tools that run in the kernel layer of the 
operating system, and tools that run on hypervisor level of the monitored operating 
system. It is good to understand that tools running in user mode are not capable to monitor 
software running with higher privileges. This also affects to software’s capability to 
monitor operating system events. User mode tools are illustrated with the Figure 4 and 
kernel mode tools with the Figure 5. FITs running in user mode cannot do RFIM as they 
are not able to hook API commands and exam the operations real-time [13]. API hooking 
in user mode is limited and to achieve real-time monitoring, software must be running in 
kernel mode. The third option, a tool that is running on hypervisor, is not suitable for the 
use case of this research as the target systems are IoT devices running the operating 







Figure 4. FIT running in user mode [12] 
 
 
Figure 5. FIT running in kernel mode [12] 
 
3.1.2.1 Tripwire 
The Kaczmarek et al. study [42] suggests Tripwire as one solution for a user space file 
monitoring. Tripwire is a company that sells a software for monitoring changes on a 
system. If a file changes, it will make an alert. The software is monitoring file metadata 
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and permissions in addition to monitoring file content changes [42]. The commercial tool 
Tripwire is available for various Windows, Linux and UNIX versions. 
 
Tripwire has also open-source version, which has been updated last time in March 2019 
[43]. Based on the GitHub repository [43], the tool was originally maintained by the 
company. The version has native support for POSIX systems but Windows users can run 
it using Cygwin. Cygwin is GNU toolkit for Windows that ports many GNU tools to 
Windows environment [44]. When the Tripwire binary is running under Cygwin, the tool 
cannot monitor Windows registry or other Windows specific attributes [45]. The open-
source version of Tripwire has support for local installation but due the limitations on 
monitoring Windows attributes, the solution is not suitable for the use case. 
 
The commercial Tripwire FIM works in a client-server manner. The FIM console and the 
user face is hosted on another server where the monitored system calls back using an 
agent. [45] The model is presented in the Figure 6. This reference architecture model is 
not preferred for the use case as the method should support standalone installation. 
 
 




3.1.2.2 SolarWinds Security Event Manager (SEM) 
SolarWinds Security Event Manager (SEM) is a tool for threat detection, automatic 
analysis and response of cyber incidents, and compliance. [46] The tool has features like 
log forwarding, memory event monitoring, and USB detection and prevention. One of the 
features is RFIM. The vendor promises that their tool is capable to report about advanced 
attacks by monitoring file integrity on the target system. The vendor claims that the tool 
has enhanced capability to reduce amount of false positives by filtering file changes that 
are not related to malicious or suspicious activity. SEM agents can be installed on AIX, 
HP UX, Linux, Mac OS X, Solaris and Windows operating systems (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Supported operating systems for SEM agents 
 
Like Tripwire, the SolarWinds requires a management server (Figure 8). The target 
system should have SEM agent running which then reports monitored information to the 
 
 20 
server. This reference architecture model is not preferred for the use case of this study as 
the method should support standalone installation. 
 
 
Figure 8. SolarWinds SEM reference architecture [47] 
3.1.2.3 Qualys FIM 
Qualys FIM is a cloud application made for file integrity monitoring. It has capability to 
monitor files, directories, and Windows registry. [48] The tool is doing the monitoring in 
real time so it is categorized as RFIM. The monitoring tool uses server-client architecture 
model but the server is hosted in Qualys’ cloud. This reference architecture model is not 
preferred for the use case of this study as the method should support standalone 
installation. 
 
3.1.2.4 Trustwave Endpoint Protection 
Trustwave Endpoint Protection is a cloud-based anti-malware, policy enforcement, 
integrity monitoring, and compliance tool. [49] The tool is capable to monitor files, 
directories, registry keys, and registry values of the target system. Access to the 
monitoring console is in the cloud so the monitored system should have an internet 
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connection. This reference architecture model is not preferred for the use case of this 
study as the method should support standalone installation. 
 
3.1.2.5 OSSEC 
Based on OSSEC documentation [50], OSSEC is an open source HIDS which supports 
Linux, UNIX and Windows based systems. On Windows systems, OSSEC monitors files 
and registry settings for changes and also stores a forensic copy of the data. Forensic copy 
means that the system can be investigated for malicious changes later on in a reliable way. 
OSSEC has other features in addition to FIM. OSSEC monitors system logs, detects 
malware and rootkits, does automated active response actions, and can be used for system 
inventory. 
 
File integrity monitoring module of OSSEC is called syscheck. [51] By default, the 
module compares SHA1 and MD5 checksums of files and registry keys on the monitored 
system to known good and alerts for mismatches. The module can also check changes in 
file size, ownership, group ownership, and permissions. The scanning is periodically so 
the OSSEC FIM works as a PFIM. The default interval for the scanning is one hour but 
the time interval is admin configurable.   
 
Based on Bray et al [51], OSSEC supports multiple different installation types: local 
installation, agent installation, and server installation. The local installation is used for 
protecting and securing single host. The agent installation is for protecting multiple hosts 
that report to a single centralized OSSEC server. The server installation is for aggregating 
information from multiple syslog services and OSSEC agent installations. Bray et al. 
argue that the local installation is also recommended to use when the servers are not able 
to connect networks where OSSEC servers are hosted. OSSEC up-to-date documentation 
however provide information only about agent/server installation. Bray et al. book is from 
2008 so it seems the information on it is obsolete and OSSEC has abandoned local 
installation for single systems. The local installation would have been suitable for the use 
case but it is not available anymore. The current OSSEC reference architecture is 
presented in the Figure 9. OSSEC uses similar architecture as Tripwire and would not be 





Figure 9. OSSEC reference architecture [52] 
3.1.2.6 Snare File Integrity Monitoring 
Snare FIM is a tool that provides file integrity monitoring. [53] Snare also provides bunch 
of other tools that they refer as File Activity Monitoring (FAM), Registry Integrity 
Monitoring (RIM) and Registry Activity Monitoring (RAM). The tool will generate text 
based logs from the systems the agent is installed to and then analyse the logs in the server 
to detect integrity changes [13]. The tool supports Windows, Linux, OSX and Solaris 
operating systems [53]. Based on Snare documentation [53], FAM compliments the FIM 
as it will also log the file details like how many times the file was changed and which 
user has been editing it. The tool has also capability to monitor Windows registry changes. 
The tool uses server-client architecture which is not ideal for the use case.  
 
3.1.3 Experimental File Integrity Tools 
3.1.3.1 Provenance-based integrity protection SPIF 
Provenance-based integrity protection SPIF system is attempt to ensure Windows’s 
integrity. The SPIF intercepts WinAPI system calls which means it works on a kernel 
level of the system. The core idea of SPIF is to sandbox all running processes and to 
detect if the process is untrusted or benign [54]. SPIF also uses concept of shadowing 
instead of always denying untrusted processes. Shadowing means that SPIF is limiting 
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the executed process to write data to specific locations. SPIF is experimental and there 
was no implementations found during the research. 
 
3.1.3.2 BinInt 
Software project BinInt seeks to ensure all binaries on the Windows system are intact 
[14]. The BinInt project has it downsides as it does not monitor other files than binaries 
for integrity. The tool does not monitor configuration files, Windows registry keys, or 
Windows registry values. Lack of visibility in other than binary files might enable 
attacker opportunities that could go undetected. For example, an attacker could edit 
configuration files before executing a software to execute malicious code or the system 
or simply just use shell scripts. BinInt is in beta and no released versions are available. 
 
3.1.3.3 Integrity Checking and Restoring (ICAR) System 
Implementing integrity monitoring and enforcement in runtime is a challenge [42]. 
Kaczmarek et al. [42] have investigated this issue and developed concept and architecture 
of Integrity Checking and Restoring (ICAR) System. Their core idea in their theoretical 
concept is to extend the file integrity checking to automatic restores if the file content has 
been changed. Based on Kaczmarek et al, options to ensure file integrity are comparing 
file fingerprint to generated database periodically on both, user and kernel user space. 
ICAR is experimental and there was no implementations found during the research. 
 
3.2 Memory integrity protection 
3.2.1 Software Guard Extensions 
Intel is providing a Software Guard Extensions (SGX) for providing system’s integrity 
and confidentiality. The SGX enables support for enclaves. When an application is 
executed with SGX, its memory is placed inside of enclave page cache (EPC). The EPC 
is not accessible for other processes, even if they are running with higher privileges. 
Basically this protects the data in memory from processes running on higher protection 




As the SGX is memory only protection for process integrity, it is focusing more on the 
kernel level threats. The SGX is good for protecting the software if it is executed on a 
system that is owned and maintained by an untrusted party [56]. The SGX defends the 
system from low level operations and could improve security against vulnerability 
exploitation, like the RCE described in introduction. 
 
Artaunov et al. [56] have described The Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX project 
SCONE that uses the Intel SGX technology on Docker containers. As described in the 
project, SGX is great for protecting containers but it might not protect the whole operating 
system and by that would not be suitable for the use case.  
 
3.2.2 Microsoft memory integrity and code integrity checking 
Microsoft Windows has a built-in memory protection capability which is also referred as 
Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (HVCI) in Microsoft documentation. The feature is 
part of core isolation [58]. The memory integrity prevents attacks from injecting code to 
high-event processes. When the HVCI is enabled, kernel memory can be marked as 
executable only through Code Integrity checking [59]. This protects the system similarly 
to SGX by defending high-event processes from code injection. 
 
3.3 Microsoft Windows features 
3.3.1 Trusted Platform Module 
 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a microcontroller which helps to assure integrity of a 
system and to secure cryptographic keys, for example the ones used for decrypting an 
encrypted disk. Similarly to SGX, TPM focuses on low level operations and only allows 
trusted code to be executed on the system. 
 
TPM creates a chain-of-trust. In the chain-of-trust, TPM is the only self-trusted 
component and it trusts the next level of the trust chain, if the cryptographic hash matches 
the one stored into it. TPM uses cryptographic functions to calculate hashes of next levels 
of the chain and it stores the hash-value to TPM storage called Platform Configuration 
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Register (PCR). First the TPM ensures Basic Input-Output System (BIOS) matches the 
stored record, than it moves to Master Boot Record (MBR), then OS loader and OS, and 
finally the application runtime libraries [60]. Chain-of-trust can be used to prevent OS 
running any other libraries than the ones accepted in PCR. 
 
Microsoft Defender System Guard uses TPM to ensure Windows 10 integrity from UEFI 
to Windows Sign-In.  The Defender System Guard relies on three integrity protection 
modules: secure boot, secure platform boot, and secure driver and defenses startup 
[Figure 10]. These modules include the TPM defenses and ensure the system integrity. 
Microsoft Defender System Guard works only with TPM 2.0, which might not be 
implemented in low resource systems [60]. Because of this, TPM will not be suitable 
directly for the use case. TPM however improves system overall security why it should 
be enabled, if TPM is available. 
 
 
Figure 10. Microsoft Windows Defender System Guard. [60] 
 
The TPM can also be used for malicious purposes like cloaking malware [61]. Dunn et 
al. argue [61] that malware can be encrypted with a key, which is stored to TPM and can 
be used by a specific malware loader. This way the decrypted malware payload can be 




3.3.2 Application whitelisting 
One way to avoid execution of malicious binaries is to use application whitelisting. 
Application whitelisting is a term for whitelisting applications that can be executed on 
the system. Typically anti-virus software work opposite way as they use database for 
known bad software and prevent execution if fingerprint of the software matches the 
database. In application whitelisting, all binaries that are allowed to run on the system are 
listed on the application whitelist [62]. The application whitelist can also be a list of 
components related to binaries and include configuration files, libraries and so on [63].  
 
Application whitelisting is generally adopted method to ensure the software that is being 
executed on the system, is good. For example Apple iPhone allows execution only for 
applications that are downloaded from Apple AppStore [62]. Romana et al. [62] argument 
that with application whitelisting, Windows operating system can perform well and be 
updated without setting the integrity and security on risk. 
 
Application whitelisting can be established for multiple different file attributes [62]. 
Some of these attributes are filename, file path, file size, digital signature or publisher 
and cryptographic hash. Application whitelisting does not have to rely only one attribute 
but can be combination of several attributes. Application can for example be allowed to 
execute if its file size, file path and publisher match for the rule.  Some of the attributes 
can be relied more than others. For example cryptographic hashes that have been 
calculated with strong algorithms, like SHA256 or SHA512, can be considered strong 
indicators of known good. Downside of the cryptographic hashes is that if the software is 
updated, the hash is changed and has to be recalculated and added to the application 
whitelist. Relying only on cryptographic hashes can impair system performance. 
Whitelisting can also be achieved for application resources. Monitoring can be leveraged 
from binaries to their resources like libraries, macros, scripts and configuration files.  
 
Pareek et al. argument that application whitelisting could potentially address the zero-day 
threats along with other malware related threats. The argument bases on the fact that 
application whitelisting does not allow anything else to be executed than trusted binaries 
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[64]. This argument is potentially dangerous as for example buffer-overflow 
vulnerabilities allow the attacker to write their own code to already loaded binary. This 
means the application whitelisting cannot protect the system from the buffer-overflow 
vulnerabilities, like RCE, as the execution permission is only checked when the binary is 
executed [65].  
3.3.2.1 AppLocker 
Microsoft provides AppLocker software for whitelisting in Windows systems. 
AppLocker allows organization to implement application control policies [66]. Based on 
AppLocker documentation [66], it can be used to define rules that allow executing 
applications from specific publisher or applications with specific product name. 
AppLocker also allows rules that allow files with specific file name, file version, file path 
or file hash to be executed. AppLocker is available for Windows 10, Windows 11, and 
Windows Server 2016 and above. 
 
Microsoft recommends to test AppLocker security policies before implementing them to 
production [67]. As the AppLocker only allows listed programs to run, it can cause 
disturbances by blocking production software from executing. This however should not 
be a problem if the policies are well tested before enabling them. The AppLocker is also 
fully closed source and Microsoft does not have any plans developing any extensions to 
AppLocker [67]. AppLocker runs on Windows with highest possible privileges but still 
has a potential for misuse. If attacker gains administrator privileges to the system, they 
can configure local group policy and either disable group policy objects (GPOs) or edit 
them to allow malicious software to be executed on the target system. However 
AppLocker should block any not allowed software to be executed on the system so it is 
less likely that the attacker could gain administrator level access to the system. In addition 
to blocking software, AppLocker is capable to block VBScript, Jscript, .bat and 
PowerShell scripts [67]. The AppLocker is not capable to block for example Perl scripts 
and office document macros or software running in POSIX subsystems. 
 
Based on literature review, AppLocker is suitable for the use case. The software should 






3.3.3.1 Microsoft approach 
Microsoft has released their own approach for Windows 10 IoT hardening [68]. They 
have divided the security hardening to five parts: device protection, threat resistance, data 
protection in motion, cloud security, and response. 
 
Device protection consists from four different core components. The system integrity is 
being taken care of by using TPM. Microsoft uses TPM for managing cryptographic keys, 
device authentication and for integrity by different security measurements. Microsoft is 
also providing Windows Device Health Attestation service. The Device Health 
Attestation means a Windows server that receives logs from IoT device’s boot process 
and analyzes them for malicious or unknown events. The Device Health Attestation 
requires internet connection from the IoT device. Third component is secure boot. Secure 
boot checks signature of software that is executed during the startup, and verifies if all of 
them are provided by trusted manufacturers. If software is not trusted, secure boot will 
prevent it running. The last component for device protection is BitLocker. BitLocker is a 
Windows’s built in disk encryption system so it will protect the data at rest. 
 
The threat resistance consists from two core Windows components: Windows Defender 
Firewall and Windows Defender. Windows Defender Firewall is Microsoft’s firewall that 
can be used to limit the attack surface of IoT devices. Based on Microsoft best practices, 
the firewall default configuration for outbound traffic is ‘allow’ and should be configured 
to default ‘deny’ in high security environments [69]. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is 
an anti-virus software that helps detecting and preventing post-breach detection and 
response. 
 
Microsoft suggests TLS-based encryption for protecting data in transit [68]. Windows 10 
IoT supports TLS 1.2 protocol, which Microsoft urges to use in encrypted connections. 
For cloud IoT appliances, Microsoft suggests using Windows Azure tools. If the 
implemented security controls fail and intrusion is made, Microsoft offers tools for 
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responding the incident. Tools provided for Windows 10 Enterprise are device 
management and device recovery. Device management can be used to monitor all IoT 
devices from one management. Device recovery allows systems to be isolated and 
reimaged without letting the security incident spread to other devices.  
3.3.3.2 Center for Internet Security benchmark and controls 
Center for Internet Security (CIS) is a nonprofit organization that provides security best 
practices [70]. The organization is known for CIS Controls and CIS Benchmarks releases. 
CIS Controls is a list of actions organizations should implement to protect themselves 
from cyber incidents. CIS Benchmarks is a set of best practices that should be used to 
configure systems. CIS Benchmarks has been released for multiple different operating 
systems and devices. CIS has not released specific benchmark for standalone Windows 
10 IoT installations but the Windows 10 Enterprise benchmark [71] can be applied on 
specific parts for the use case. The whole benchmark document is 1254 pages long and is 
written for Active Directory (AD) joined systems. 
 
The benchmark recommends Windows logging feature Audit System Integrity is set to 
Success and Failure. The feature does enable different logging events for Microsoft which 
help identifying security incidents related to system integrity changes. As this is logging 
module, it does not block or prevent any malicious changes on the system. CIS benchmark 
also recommends turning on virtualization-based security (VBS). The setting enables 
kernel mode memory protections, which are part of the Code Integrity. The protection 
disallows code to be marked as executable on kernel mode and protects the system from 
for example code injection. The option requires CPU virtualization feature (Intel VT-X 
or AMD-V) which might not be available for the use case.  
 
CIS Controls [72] and CIS Benchmarks [71] recommend using Windows Defender 
Exploit Guard (WDEG). WDEG is a Windows specific capability which was released in 
Windows 10 Fall Creators Update [73]. The capability allows integrity checks on system 
startup, run time, and after run time [74]. The startup protection aims to validate boot 
sequence and that no malicious firmware or software are loaded during the startup. The 
system protection on runtime aims to protect Windows kernel. The highest privilege level 
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on Windows systems is SYSTEM and if an attacker gains access to SYSTEM level 
account, the game is lost [74].  
 
 
Figure 11. Virtualization-based security (VBS) with WDEG [74] 
 
3.4 Summary 
Considering the use case defined in the Chapter 1, suitable methods for ensuring the 
system integrity are researched File Integrity Tools (FITs), application whitelisting and 
Microsoft recommendations for memory protection and system hardening. Because 
layered protection is recommended for better security, using a FIT, application 
whitelisting and memory integrity protection at the same time would be the best from 
security perspective. Due the limited resources in the use case, doing layered security for 
integrity protection might not be an option. The performance testing will research which 
of the feasible methods can be stacked for layered defense. 
 
The Table 1 presents the methods that were presented in the literature review. From file 
integrity tools Tripwire, SolarWinds, OSSEC, and Snare were picked to be tested in the 
performance test. However, Tripwire did not provide license for testing and was left out 
from the comparison. AppLocker will be also tested separately. Hardening best practices, 
including enabling SGX, memory integrity and TPM, depend on the hardware the system 
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is running. Ideally all of them would be enabled but limited resource systems do not 
necessarily have Intel processors for SGX, or TPM modules. Qualys, and Trustwave FIM 
products required connection from the monitored system to their cloud. The use case 
system cannot have continuous connection to cloud which makes these two options not 
feasible for the use case. SPIF, BinInt and ICAR are experimental methods that did not 
have released implementations at the time of this research.  
 
Method Feasible Feasible with considerations Not feasible 
FIT: Tripwire*  ●  
FIT: SolarWinds SEM  ●  
FIT: Qualys FIM   ● 
FIT: Trustwave EP   ● 
FIT: OSSEC  ●  
FIT: Snare FIM  ●  
FIT: SPIF**   ● 
FIT: BinInt**   ● 
FIT: ICAR**   ● 
SGX  ●  
Microsoft memory integrity  ●  
TPM  ●  
Hardening best practices  ●  
AppLocker ●   
Table 1. Integrity protection methods summary. 
* = Tripwire did not answer enquiries for testing license. 






4 Configuring monitoring and measuring performance 
This chapter describes how performance testing was completed and what the outcome of 
it was. Testing environment is presented in the Section 4.1 and monitoring method in 
Section 4.2. Configurations for tested integrity monitoring tools are introduced in the 
Section 4.3. Finally the performance testing results are presented in the Section 4.4. 
4.1 Test environment 
 
 
Figure 12. Test environment topology 
 
Testing was completed in a virtualized network. VMWare Workstation 16 Pro was used 
as a hypervisor software and Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSB 2015 was installed as a 
virtual machine on the hypervisor. The Windows 10 IoT machine was connected to the 
virtualized network, which did not have internet access. The network did not have 
internet access to avoid unwanted changes to the target system during the testing. 
 
If the tested file integrity method required a server, it was installed on the same 
hypervisor. As shown in the Figure 13, the testing machine had similar configuration as 
the reference device but the system is running virtually. The Windows 10 IoT system 
had the target test system software component running to ensure the testing 
environment would have equivalent load to the use case. The tested file integrity 






Figure 13. Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSB 2015 system in the test environment 
4.2 Monitoring method 
Microsoft Performance Monitor, or PerfMon, is a software, which is built in to Windows 
systems [75]. The tool is created for real time performance monitoring but it has 
capabilities to record performance data of the whole system or just from specific 
processes. The tool can for example monitor memory usage, disk usage, and CPU usage. 
In this thesis, we use Performance Counter set from Data Collector Sets of the PerfMon 
tool. The tool captures performance data at a custom time interval, which is user 
configurable. 
 
In this research, PerfMon Data Collector Set is configured using Create manually mode 
and just to collect data logs about software performance, as shown in the Figure 12. Then 
the process of the tested integrity tool is chosen as a counter using PerfMon counter list. 
Last the data format is changed from the DataCollector01 Properties to comma separated 





Figure 14. PerfMon Data Collector Set-configuration 
 
PerfMon records total of 28 different performance attributes from running process. As 
we are comparing the CPU, memory and disk I/O usage, the ones that are used in this 
research are processor time, virtual bytes, working set, IO read bytes/sec, and IO write 
bytes/sec. The processor time means the percentage of time that the specific process has 
individually reserved from the CPU [76]. Working set is a measurement for how much 
the process requires physical memory from the system while the virtual bytes measure 
how much virtual address space the process requires from the computer [77]. Virtual 
bytes can be more than the actual physical memory is because it also includes the file 
that may have been paged out, or data that is shared among other processes, like shared 
DLLs [78]. IO read and write measures how much data in bytes the process is writing to 
the disk. The measurement interval is set to 15 seconds and the performance 





4.3.1 SolarWinds SEM 
As presented in the Chapter 3, SolarWinds SEM uses server-client architecture. In this 
test case SolarWinds SEM virtual appliance was implemented to the virtual network and 
agent installed on the monitored system. The agent connected to the SEM server. The 
SEM server console is presented in the Figure 15.  SolarWinds SEM server is delivered 
as an OVA (Open Virtual Appliance) format and most of the hypervisors support 
importing it directly. 
 
 
Figure 15. SolarWinds SEM server console 
 
The SolarWinds SEM default agent configuration did not have File Integrity Monitoring 
(FIM) enabled, as shown in the Figure 16. The SEM configuration had to be enabled from 
the SEM web console before it started to record file integrity monitoring. The tool also 
has separate options for file and directory monitoring, and registry monitoring. The tool 
allows directory, file, and registry black- and whitelisting. By default, the tool monitors 





Figure 16. Windows FIM File and Directory, and Registry are disabled by default  
 
SolarWinds SEM agent is installed as a service and the service calls SWLEMAgent.exe 
binary. The SWLEMAgent.exe binary launches Java process, which is the actual agent 
software. These two processes are presented in the Figure 17. The Java process was set 
to monitoring target in the PerfMon. 
 
 
Figure 17. SWLEMAgent.exe launching Java 
4.3.2 OSSEC 
OSSEC uses the same architecture as SolarWinds SEM. OSSEC virtual appliance was 
installed to the test network and then agent deployed to the test machine. As shown in the 
Figure 18, the virtual appliance is a CentOS 7 server, which runs the OSSEC server 
software. OSSEC is delivered as an OVA format and most of the hypervisors support 





Figure 18. OSSEC appliance version 
 
Before installing agents on the monitored system, the agent have to be added to the 
OSSEC server. OSSEC server ships with a manage_clients tool, which can be used to 
generate configuration for the agent. The tool requires name of the new agent, IP 
address of the monitored system, and ID number for the new agent. After providing 
these information to the system, agent key, which is used for authentication, can be 





Figure 19. OSSEC agent configuration 
 
OSSEC website has agents for supported operating systems, which can be downloaded 
from there. After installing the agent on the target system, the agent needs to be 
configured using OSSEC Agent Manager-software. The configuration requires IP 
address of the OSSEC server and authentication key, which was previously extracted 
from the OSSEC server agent configuration. After successfully providing the key, the 
OSSEC Agent Manager confirms that the configuration was stored successfully, as 




Figure 20. Agent installed on the target system 
 
The OSSEC starts OSSEC HIDS [OssecSvc] service with SYSTEM privileges. The 
service starts ossec-agent.exe process, which is used to monitor the server and report 
findings back to the OSSEC server. The process information is presented in the Figure 
21. The ossec-agent.exe process was set to monitoring target in the PerfMon. 
 
 
Figure 21. OssecSvc running on the target system 
 
After the agent is successfully configured, it connects back to the OSSEC server using 
port 1514/UDP. The connection can be verified from the OSSEC server using internal 







Figure 22. Verifying successful connection 
 
By default, the OSSEC installation does not enable active response for the agent. Active 
response is a feature in OSSEC, which allows defense actions [79]. These actions are 
for example pre-configured scripts on the target system. The OSSEC documentation 
gives an example of null routing all Windows connectivity when an event, that is set to 
trigger an alert occurs. 
 
The OSSEC project uses Kibana for visualization. The Kibana is an open frontend 
application that uses Elastic Stack, or ELK. It can be used for data visualization and 




Figure 23. OSSEC uses Kibana for visualization 
 
The results presented in the Appendix A revealed that OSSEC did not require almost at 
all CPU time on the monitored system. The low amount of CPU usage on OSSEC agent 
suggests it did not run any checks during the test period. The OSSEC documentation 
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suggests that the checks are executed every six hours by default. Taking a look to 
OSSEC’s configuration files, the syscheck runs on agent startup and every 20 hours. Due 
to long default syscheck interval. OSSEC was configured to run the syscheck every 60 
seconds. The OSSEC default configuration monitors multiple locations on Windows file 
system and registry. These locations include for example the default auto run keys. The 
configuration is presented in the Appendix B. 
 
For some reason, OSSEC syscheck kept getting disabled during the tests. After restarting 
the service, the OSSEC agent logs were filled with errors. The errors are presented in the 
Figure 24. 
 
2021/12/06 00:24:39 ossec-agent: Starting syscheckd thread. 
2021/12/06 00:24:39 ossec-agent(1756): ERROR: Duplicated 
directory given: 'C:\Windows/regedit.exe'. 
2021/12/06 00:24:39 ossec-agent(1756): ERROR: Duplicated 
directory given: 'C:\Windows/system.ini'. 
[-- log rows removed --] 
2021/12/06 00:24:39 ossec-agent(1756): ERROR: Duplicated 
directory given: 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon'. 
2021/12/06 00:24:39 ossec-agent(1756): ERROR: Duplicated 
directory given: 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Active 
Setup\Installed Components'. 
2021/12/06 00:24:39 ossec-syscheckd: WARN: Syscheck disabled. 
Figure 24. OSSEC logs showing that Syscheck is disabled 
 
Based on the error, the configured syscheck monitors are for some reason duplicated and 
the check process stops working. This means that the tool is not capable to detect any 
changes on the system. OSSEC GitHub repository has an open issue for this error, but 
there is no developers’ comments or fix suggestions how to solve it [81]. As the tool is 
not able to do reliable file integrity monitoring, the tests were not continued with the tool. 
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4.3.3 Snare FIM 
Snare FIM is delivered as an ISO (Optical disc image) image which means, it can be 
installed on virtual machine, physical machine, or to the cloud. The ISO image does not 
support VMWare easy installation which should be noticed during the installation. After 
installation the appliance pauses to the login screen, as shown in the Figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25. Snare FIM server console 
 
After installing the appliance, web console becomes available. The whole tool can be 
configured through the web console. The web console has a dashboard view, which is 





Figure 26. Snare dashboard 
 
The Snare agent has to be downloaded from their webpage. After installing the Snare 
agent to the test machine, it needed to be configured to connect back to the Snare server. 
Snare server has Snare Agent Management (SAM) component running. It is good to 
note that SAM in Windows system refers to Security Account Manager which contains 
user account information of the system. After connecting the Snare Agent to the Snare 
Server, it became visible in the Snare Agent Management, as shown in the Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27. Snare Agent connected to Snare Agent Management 
 
Snare does not have templates for file integrity monitoring (FIM) nor registry integrity 
monitoring (RIM). The monitoring files and paths have to be configured manually 
during the implementation. RIM and FIM monitoring works in PFIM manner. Both 





Figure 28. RIM enabled with hourly schedule 
 
Similarly to SolarWinds, Snare creates service on the monitored machine. The service 
executes SnareCore.exe, which is the agent software installed on the system. This 
process was set as the performance monitoring target. The Snare service is presented in 
the Figure 29. 
 
 







Figure 30. Local Group Policy settings for AppLocker 
 
AppLocker is included in Windows Enterprise editions and does not require additional 
software to be installed. AppLocker is configured through Group Policies (GPO). As the 
target system is not domain joined, the local configuration for it is called Local Group 
Policy (LGPO). The LGPO can be edited through Windows Local Group Policy Editor, 
as presented in the Figure 30. AppLocker allows different execution rules for executables, 
Windows installers, scripts, and packaged apps. In this test scenario, executable rules are 
used. By default, AppLocker adds three executable rules which of two allow all users to 
execute software from Program Files and Windows Folder while the third allows 
BUILTIN\Administrators group to execute software from any location. The used rule set 






Figure 31. Enabled AppLocker rules. 
 
After configuring the LGPO to allow needed software, the AppLocker needs to be 
enabled. AppLocker can run either in Audit only –mode, where the execution is logged 
to the Windows event logs, or in Enforce rules –mode, where non-allowed software 
execution gets blocked.  
 
The AppLocker will start on the target system when Application Identity –service is 
started. The LGPO configuration does not automatically start the service, which means it 
needs to be started manually on the first time. The Application Identity –service is 
presented in the Figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 32. Application Identity –service 
 
The Application Identity –service uses svchost.exe for the monitoring. Svchost.exe is a 
generic host process on Microsoft Windows systems. The purpose of the process is to run 
internal processes. On the test system, the process id (PID) of the svchost.exe instance 
that the Application Identity uses was 84 during the tests. As shown in the Figure 33, 
multiple other Windows services use the same process. This means that the monitored 
data of the AppLocker is not comparable to other measurements as Windows is running 
multiple different tasks with the same process. Performance Monitor does not show by 
 
 47 
default the PID of the monitored process. To be able to identify which of the running, 
PID was needed to identify correct svchost instance. PID can be enabled on Performance 
Monitor by adding 32-bit DWORD registry entry with decimal value of 2 to 
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\PerfProc\Performance. After adding the 
change and restarting Performance Monitor, PID appeared to monitor data. 
 
 





4.4 Test results 
 
The test results had lot of variation between each tool, as shown in the Table 2. The raw 
test data is presented in the Appendix A. These results present the load the tool adds to 
the idle system. First row of the Table 2 presents used Processor Time (%). The maximum 
amount of Processor Time could theoretically be 100%. If a process used 100% off the 
CPU time, then other processes could not function as the CPU would be too busy to 
operate any other instructions than the ones coming from the tested process. The second 
row presents amount of Virtual Bytes the software is using. As introduced in the Section 
4.2, Virtual Bytes presents the whole amount of memory the process uses. Virtual Bytes 
includes paged out files. The Working Set was introduced in the Section 4.2 as well. 
Working Set presents the amount of memory the process uses from the actual physical 
memory available. The highest amount of the available physical memory depends on the 
system. In this testing scenario, the virtual machine had 4GB of RAM, which is the 
maximum value of Working Set in our test scenario. Disc read and write presents the 
amount of data the software is either writing or reading from the disk. For all the items in 
the table, the highest number is the worst. 
 
Average SolarWinds SEM Snare FIM Applocker¹ 
Processor time (%) 0,58 0,90 0,68 
Virtual bytes (MB) 1785,99 91,38 2097368,24 
Working set (MB) 191,92 25,84 33,74 
Disk read (bytes / sec) 0 32945,47 472,56 
Disk write (bytes / sec) 65,14 0 563,52 
Table 2. Test results compared 
¹ = Test data not comparable. The monitored process is shared among multiple 
Windows services. 
 
Based on the results from the Performance Monitor, Snare and SolarWinds require almost 
the equal amount of CPU time. Snare FIM processor usage was the highest of the tested 
tools, which could be problematic in a limited environment. However, the average of 
Snare FIM CPU usage was under 1% of the CPU capability. AppLocker data is not 
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comparable as the same svchost instance was used by other services as well. The average 
percentage of CPU time on that svchost instance is however lower than in Snare FIM. 
The Processor Time is presented in the Figure 34. 
 
 
Figure 34. Processor time used 
 
SolarWinds SEM used by far the most of memory, as shown in the Figure 35. Working 
set of the SolarWinds was almost 200 MB, while Snare FIM used around 26 MB. The 
AppLocker was not compared in memory usage as it used large amount of virtual bytes 
and was not comparable to other tools. The amount of virtual bytes used by svchost 
instance is likely explained by the number of services that use the process. The amount 
of SolarWinds SEM is requiring memory might be a problem in a limited environment 
system. The continuous need for 200 MB of memory is not a problem if there is 8 GB 
of RAM but if the number is lower, like 2GB or 4GB, the system might start to perform 
poorly while the SolarWinds SEM agent is running.  
 
Solarwinds SEM Snare FIM Applocker¹

















Figure 35. Memory usage of each FIM tool 
 
Disk usage on SolarWinds SEM and AppLocker was very limited. Snare FIM had disk 
read operations clearly more than other tools. The difference between different tools is 
visualized in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36. Disc operations 
 
Based on the performance results, none of the tools use too much resources for the use 
case and by that do not affect the system performance. The SolarWinds SEM use lot of 
virtual bytes but as presented earlier this chapter, virtual bytes include the working set 
Solarwinds SEM Snare FIM
Virtual bytes (MB) 1785,99 3,82


















Disk read (bytes / sec) 0,00 32945,47 472,56






















and also other memory-mapped files, like shared DLLs. Based on the working set, 
SolarWinds SEM is the most resources hungry application. CPU and disk I/O wise the 
Snare FIM used the most resources. The CPU usage is not significantly more than the 
other FIM tools use and all the tools can be considered using low CPU resources when 
running on background. 
 
Snare promises on their website that their agent uses less than 5% CPU and less than 20 
MB memory [53]. This however was not the case in the testing as the Snare FIM Agent 
used average of 25.84 MB of memory. CPU usage was lower than the maximum they 
promised. SolarWinds does not provide information how much CPU and memory their 
agent uses on the target system but they recommend that the system should have at least 
512 MB of RAM. As the recommendation is relatively small, the tool can be considered 
as low resource system friendly. SolarWinds however used almost 200 MB of memory 
during the tests, which is relatively a lot considering the system was on idle and only 
FIM and RIM rules were configured. 
 
Of course, the amount of memory and CPU are related to the number of implemented 
monitoring rules on all FIM tools. This also applies to AppLocker. If lot of different 




5 Blocking and detection capabilities 
5.1 Testing method 
The testing for malware detection and blocking capabilities is executed with malware 
types that are presented in the Chapter 2 of this master’s thesis. The first executed 
malware was Quasar RAT, which connects back to its command and control server in the 
same network. The second malware was ransomware simulator Fransom. The third tested 
malware was a PowerShell command that downloads malicious reverse shell script and 
executes it in memory only. 
 
For blocking and detection capabilities, tool configuration was set to monitor the paths 
the malware would use. This way it was possible to detect if the tool had capability to 
detect and block the malware.  
5.1.1 Remote Access Trojan (RAT): Quasar 
 
Figure 37. Quasar RAT listening port 4782/TCP 
 
Quasar is an open-source Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The GitHub page describes the 
software as a light-weight remote administration tool [82]. The tool has a C2 server 
component that runs on a Windows system. As shown in the Figure 37, the C2 server was 
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installed to the testing network, defined with IP address 172.16.42.250 and set to listen 
port 4782/TCP, which is the default port of the Quasar RAT. After installing the C2 server 
component, agent software was generated with the server and installed manually to the 




Figure 38. Test environment topology for Quasar RAT 
 
5.1.2 Ransomware simulator: Fransom 
 




Fransom is an open-source ransomware simulator project by Fraktal. The GitHub 
repository includes solution file (.sln) for the project, which can be then build using 
Microsoft Visual Studio, as shown in the Figure 39. [34] After building the solution file, 
executable file can be executed on Windows systems. The Fransom executable prints help 
if no arguments are given to the software. The help shows available arguments, as shown 
in the Figure 40. Ransomware simulator Fransom is deployed to the systems from an 
USB drive. The deployment is presented more closely in the Section 5.2.2. 
 
 
Figure 40. Compiling Fransom project on Visual Studio 
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5.1.3 Fileless malware: Chimera 
 
Figure 41. Chimera obfuscation tool on Kali Linux 
 
To bypass Microsoft’s own security controls, the malware must be obfuscated. For 
obfuscating the payload, open-source tool Chimera was used [83]. The tool obfuscates 
any given PowerShell commands and makes them undetectable by common anti-virus 
projects. For fileless malware testing, Kali Linux was installed to the test network. The 
Kali Linux was used to generate the fileless malware payload and as a C2 server for the 
fileless malware. Generation of the malicious payload is presented in the Figure 41. The 
generated payload is staged PowerShell. The first layer downloads malicious script from 
the C2 server and then executes it in the memory. The execution does not write any files 
to the disk and all operations are executed in the memory. The malicious script opens 
reverse shell connection to the C2 server using port 4444/TCP. The C2 server was set to 
listen the port using nc (netcat). Execution of the malware is presented more closely in 
the Section 5.2.3. 
5.2 Test results 
5.2.1 Quasar RAT 
The malware was delivered to the system via USB flash drive. Immediately after 
connecting the USB device to the testing host, Windows Defender detected the malware 




Figure 42: Windows Defender detecting the malware 
 
 
Figure 43: Windows Defender turned off through LGPO 
 
To ensure that only the FIM products are tested, Windows Defender antivirus was 
turned off for the testing. Real-time protection, cloud-based protection, and sample 
submission was turned off from the settings. Windows Defender was also turned off 
using LGPO, as shown in the Figure 43. After turning the Windows Defender off, the 
malware as able to execute and connect back to the C2 server. The connection appears 





Figure 44. Test server connecting back to C2 
 
To test how good the FIM product detects and defends against the threat, the same actions 
were executed on the target system against all FIM products. First shell access was 
opened and command whoami /all executed on the system. Then file explorer was opened 
and new Quasar RAT executable was dropped to the current users AppData folder. After 
dropping the executable, new auto run key was set so that the executable would be started 
automatically during the next login.  
5.2.1.1 SolarWinds SEM 
SolarWinds SEM registry integrity monitor was configured to monitor auto run locations 
at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. The monitor was set to 
watch any writes or changes in the given registry paths. Deletes and reads were not 
monitored. The SolarWinds SEM was also set to monitor C-drive for any changes on 
binary or script files. 
 
After the USB flash drive was connected to the system, SolarWinds SEM raised an event 
to the monitoring console. The shell connection was not detected but when the Quasar 
RAT executable was dropped to the user AppData folder, multiple events appeared to the 
monitoring console. These events are presented in the Figure 45. The SolarWinds SEM 
also detected creation of the auto run persistence and reported it to the monitoring 
console. None of the actions were blocked even though the Windows Active Response 
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with default configuration was enabled in the SolarWinds SEM node connections. The 
lack of response actions is likely due the limited configuration applied to the installation. 
 
 
Figure 45. SolarWinds detecting Quasar RAT file writes 
5.2.1.2 Snare FIM 
In this test scenario, Snare FIM was configured to monitor exe and txt files from C:\ drive. 
By default, Snare does not do any integrity monitoring so configuring the monitored paths 
was necessary. In ideal implementation all necessary file and directory paths would be 
configured to ensure that no malicious files get installed without a notice. Alerts from the 
FIM were set to critical priority to detect any malicious changes on the disk. As the Snare 
FIM works in PFIM method, the schedule for scanning was set to ten minutes. 
 
Snare RIM was also configured to monitor two auto run locations: 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. The HKLM stores auto 
runs for Local System while the HKCU stores auto runs for current user. After setting up 
the monitoring, malware was launched from USB flash drive. The malware opened 





Snare FIM managed to detect file creation for malicious file and also the auto run key 
creation for the default user on the target system. The results are presented in the Figure 
46 and Figure 47. However, monitoring did not detect the process creation, execution of 
the whoami command nor execution of the original file from USB drive. This is likely 
due the lack of configuration and could be fixed by adding monitoring rules for directories 
and files. However, Snare FIM does not have capability to block malicious software. 
Based on Snare website, the Snare FIM is for security monitoring and compliance, not 
blocking malicious activities. 
 
 
Figure 46: Snare FIM detecting file creation 
 
 
Figure 47. Snare FIM detecting new auto run key 
 
5.2.1.3 AppLocker 
Before doing the Quasar RAT detection testing, AppLocker rules were generated from 
the clean installation. This means that all the executables that were present on the system 
during the rule generation, are allowed to run. 
 
The USB flash drive was plugged into the machine, and the Quasar RAT was attempted 
to be executed. AppLocker blocked the execution as the Quasar RAT executable is not 
whitelisted executable or signed by whitelisted publisher. The AppLocker alert window 






Figure 48. AppLocker blocking the Quasar RAT 
 
5.2.2 Fransom 
Fransom was delivered to the system with a USB flash drive. The console executable was 
executed as an administrator. Ransomware needs access to files that only administrator 
can access, which is why ransomware attacks usually do not start before the attacker has 
gained administrator level access to target networks. Fransom was executed with 
userregkey and scheduled-task parameters, which create persistence on the system. 
Parameter delete-eventlogs deletes event logs and parameter delete-shadow-copies 
deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies, which is Windows internal method for taking 
backups. The last parameters enumerate-user-profile and encrypt-user-profile enumerate 
files and directories under the current user and then encrypt them. The chosen parameters 
try to emulate typical ransomware attack, where persistence is first made, then logs and 
backups deleted, and lastly the system is encrypted. The chosen parameters are presented 
in the Figure 49 and execution of Fransom is presented in the Figure 50. 
 
E:\Fransom.exe --scheduled-task --userregkey --delete-eventlogs 
--delete-shadow-copies --enumerate-shadow-copies --enumerate-
user-profile --encrypt-user-profile 





Figure 50. Fransom actions executed on the test environment 
 
5.2.2.1 SolarWinds SEM 
When the Fransom was executed on the target system, SolarWinds SEM was able to 
detect creation of the registry key persistence and Windows event log removal, as shown 
in the Figure 51. Lack of visibility to other activities like shadow copy deletion and 
scheduled task creation was likely due the lack of configuration. The RIM was configured 
to monitor only specific auto run locations and the FIM was configured to monitor only 
specific file types on the disk. 
 
 
Figure 51. SolarWinds detecting cleared logs and persistence 
 
5.2.2.2 Snare FIM 
In this use case, Snare was not able to detect anything else than the created registry key 
persistence. Registry key detection is presented in the Figure 52. This likely due the lack 
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of configuration. As presented in the Section 5.2.1.3, Snare was set to monitor C-drive 
for .exe and .txt changes. Based on the Snare FIM monitoring, Fransom did not change 
any .exe or .txt files on the file system. The lack of visibility is likely a configuration 
problem and the tool should be configured properly to monitor desired locations on the 
disk and the registry. Once again, the tool does not have ability to block ransomware but 
it should be able to detect it. 
 
 
Figure 52. Snare detecting created auto run event 
 
5.2.2.3 AppLocker 
After the USB flash drive was connected to the target system, command shell was opened 
and Fransom.exe executed from the flash drive. AppLocker blocked the execution as the 
Fransom.exe was not whitelisted. Output of Fransom execution attempt is presented in 
the Figure 53. 
 
 
Figure 53. Fransom blocked by AppLocker 
5.2.3 Chimera 
As presented in the Section 5.1.3, penetration testing tool Chimera was used to create 
PowerShell payloads for fileless malware testing. In this scenario, malicious command is 
executed using command line. The command executes WMIC, which creates new hidden 
PowerShell process that downloads payload from the C2 server. The downloaded payload 
is not stored to the disk and the PowerShell process executes it straight after download in 
memory. The executed command is presented in the Figure 54. 
 










Figure 54. The executed malicious command that downloads and executes the payload 
 
After getting reverse shell to the target system, whoami command was executed using 
the reverse shell. Then hacked.txt file was created on the desktop of the default user to 
generate file integrity changes on the system. The command executed through the 
reverse shell are presented in the Figure 55. 
 
 
Figure 55. Text file hacked.txt written on the desktop of the default user 
5.2.3.1 SolarWinds SEM 
SolarWinds SEM was not able to detect anything during the fileless malware execution. 
The FIM was not configured to monitor text files which likely caused the lack of visibility 
to file creation. The malware did not write anything to registry, which is the reason that 
the RIM did not monitor detect any registry changes on the target system. 
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5.2.3.2 Snare FIM 
On the fileless malware testing, Snare FIM did not detect anything. FIM and RIM 
configuration was exactly the same as in the Section 5.2.2.3 testing but for some unknown 
reason, creation of the hacked.txt text file was not detected on the system. The lack of 
visibility was likely due the lack of configuration. 
5.2.3.3 AppLocker 
The payload was executed using non-elevated shell on the machine. After executing the 
payload, reverse shell was opened and access gained to the system. AppLocker did not 
block the execution nor the command executed through the shell. 
5.3 Summary 
Based on the detection and blocking tests, none of the tools were able to block or detect 
all the threats. The test results are presented in the Table 3. AppLocker stood out in its 
capability in blocking and detecting threats. Both commercial FIM tools, SolarWinds 
SEM and Snare FIM, were able to detect the changes they were configured to monitor. 
 
None of the tools were able to detect or block fileless malware. This means that the file 
integrity monitoring tools and whitelisting tools are incapable to detect malware that does 
not write anything to disk or Windows registry with used configuration. The tested tools 
had lot of configuration capabilities, which were not researched and configured in this 
thesis. These tools might have capabilities to detect and even block fileless malware for 




SNARE FIM APPLOCKER 
RAT Detected Detected Blocked 
RANSOMWARE Detected Detected Blocked 
FILELESS N/A N/A N/A 
Table 3. Detection and block matrix 
 
None of the tools worked perfectly without additional configuration. The best detection 
and blocking result comes after configuring the tool to match the monitored system and 
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applications it is running. In these tests, lack of configuration leaded to lesser visibility 
and for example most of the ransomware activities were missed. 
 
Based on these test results, AppLocker would be the most suitable choice for the use of 
the use case described in the Section 1.2. The tool stood out in the malware blocking 
tests and it was the only tool tested, which is available as a standalone product. The tool 
however requires configuration so that it will not block updates on the target software or 
operating system. This configuration is not included in this master’s thesis. 
 
In this thesis, security of limited environment system was attempted to be improved 
through ensuring the file system integrity. Literature review and empiric testing resulted 




The literature review identified multiple options for ensuring file system integrity. The 
list of the methods and tools are presented in the Section 3. In this thesis the research 
focused on the file integrity monitoring and application whitelisting approaches. File 
integrity monitoring implementations SolarWinds and Snare were tested in the lab 
environment along with the application whitelisting tool AppLocker. Based on the 
research results, the Windows built-in implementation of application whitelisting was the 
most efficient way to protect the system from getting infected by malware. However, the 
protection must be well maintained and configured to ensure it allows necessary binaries 
on the system to run and to be updated. 
 
The tested implementations did not significantly affect the system performance. All of 
the tools ran on relatively low load. However the commercial tools used some computer 
resources more than the built-in feature. The load of the tools may of course rise when 
the tools are configured and for example new monitored files and directories are added to 
the tools. Based on the testing results, the affection of the integrity tool was low on the 
target system. 
 
None of the chosen methods was able to block or detect fileless malware. When the 
fileless payload was executed, it did not store any configuration to file system or 
Windows registry. As the malware payload was only in memory, the selected tools did 
not have visibility to it and were not able to detect or block it. 
 
6.1 Discussion 
Based on the literature review, endpoint protection tools are moving from standalone 
installations to server-agent infrastructure. For limited environment systems, like hospital 
instruments, server-agent infrastructure might be a hard option to implement. Hospitals 
often have limited budget on information security and purchasing an EDR, an EPP, or an 
FIM solution and installing on limited environment systems might be out of the scope. 
The hospital instruments might not also have internet connectivity, which excludes 
possibility to use cloud based solutions. The information security cannot also be only on 
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instrument manufacturer’s responsibility. Price of the medical instrument would go up if 
security solutions that require expensive licenses would be built-in to the systems. 
 
Options for ensuring file system integrity varied. Academic work presented tools that 
were only described in theoretical level but no real life implementations were made. 
Ideally this master’s thesis researched for a tool that would have protected the system 
from malicious intensions by protecting the system integrity. The same tool would have 
detected and reported any changes on the file system integrity. This kind of tool was not 
identified through the academic review but AppLocker was really close to the original 
goal. 
6.2 Future research 
The testing also indicated that all of the integrity tools require a lot of configuration before 
they are useful. This configuration was not part of the work and all tests were executed 
using either default or generated configuration. It would be interesting to see how well 
limited environment systems can be protected using file integrity monitoring tools while 
they are properly configured. 
 
In this thesis, Windows memory integrity was appropriately omitted from the testing. 
Methods and implementations that were researched were not able to protect the system 
against fileless malware. It would be interesting to see if there are methods and 
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0 0 0,833053 0,208536424 0,624911 
15 0 0,520663 0,729076854 0,416576 
30 0 1,353998 0,520775826 0,938321 
45 0 1,145515 0,31246656 0 
60 
0.10419804486
589759 0,833826 0,520771556 0,624877 
75 0 1,041634 0,312453778 0,937436 
90 0 0,104148 0,417048138 0,416591 
105 0 0,312446 0,833252491 0 
120 
0.10405916106
618596 0,312452 1,45817968 0,520777 
135 0 0,625561 0,520759576 0,417033 
150 0 0,41657 0,208293201 0,520746 
165 0 0,416592 0,416597114 0 
180 0 0,624933 0,833259084 0,416595 
195 0 0,833187 0,937349549 8,644646 
210 0 0,729027 0,625615297 2,082815 
225 0 0,625544 0,416623049 0 
240 0 0,416558 0,104158276 0,833236 
255 0 0,624886 0,208308443 0,728993 
270 0 1,458031 0,416610646 0,520763 
285 0 1,457965 0,312434916 0 
300 0 0,938007 0,833204031 0,728996 
315 0 0,312466 0,937278371 0,417052 
330 0 0,624871 0,72989102 0,624876 
345 0 0,520736 1,041581132 0 
360 0 0,312776 1,457508957 0,416587 
375 0 0,729005 0,312445114 0,520737 
390 0 1,353676 0,4166303 0,416603 
405 0 1,041314 0,521291705 0 
420 0 1,459627 0,312462313 0,833177 
435 0 1,14555 0,312466579 0,937134 
450 0 0,624922 0,312462227 0,937257 
465 0 0,520761 0,208312738 0 
480 0 1,770416 0,416627073 0,624699 
495 0 1,459566 0,937393112 0,312369 
510 0 0,833126 0,729074035 0,521292 
525 0 1,562161 1,041558442 0 
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540 0 1,041554 0,729861524 0,416591 
555 
0.10424112540
760447 0,104149 0,208307614 0,729066 
570 
0.10407906193
251726 1,041507 1,041553866 0,520749 
585 
0.10421779383
196475 2,814951 0,624890503 0,104153 
600 
0.10413728537
297154 1,873809 0,312464798 0,312443 

















0 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
15 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
30 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
45 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
60 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
75 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
90 34562048 95842304 1872744448 2,2E+12 
105 34562048 95842304 1872744448 2,2E+12 
120 34562048 95842304 1872744448 2,2E+12 
135 34562048 95842304 1872744448 2,2E+12 
150 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
165 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
180 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
195 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
210 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
225 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
240 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
255 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
270 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
285 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
300 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
315 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
330 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
345 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
360 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
375 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
390 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
405 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
420 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
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435 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
450 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
465 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
480 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
495 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
510 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
525 34562048 94785536 1872744448 2,2E+12 
540 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
555 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
570 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
585 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
600 34562048 96899072 1872744448 2,2E+12 
















0 6635520 27058176 200720384 36446208 
15 6635520 27058176 200720384 36397056 
30 6635520 27058176 200720384 36421632 
45 6635520 27058176 200720384 36274176 
60 6635520 27058176 200720384 34607104 
75 6635520 27058176 200720384 34578432 
90 6635520 27041792 200720384 34603008 
105 6639616 27041792 200720384 34455552 
120 6639616 27041792 200728576 34594816 
135 6639616 27041792 200728576 34611200 
150 6639616 27025408 200728576 34557952 
165 6639616 27025408 201007104 34410496 
180 6639616 27025408 201007104 34574336 
195 6639616 27025408 201007104 38031360 
210 6639616 27025408 201007104 38215680 
225 6639616 27025408 201007104 38006784 
240 6639616 27025408 201011200 38109184 
255 6639616 27025408 201011200 37912576 
270 6639616 27025408 201011200 37818368 
285 6639616 27025408 201048064 37216256 
300 6639616 27127808 201048064 37289984 
315 6348800 27160576 201048064 34877440 
330 6348800 27160576 201048064 34873344 
345 6348800 27160576 201048064 34709504 
360 6348800 27160576 201142272 34795520 
375 6348800 27160576 201142272 34578432 
 
 81 
390 6348800 27160576 201142272 34598912 
405 6348800 27160576 201142272 34484224 
420 6430720 27127808 201142272 34611200 
435 6430720 27127808 201142272 34586624 
450 6430720 27127808 201170944 34590720 
465 6430720 27127808 201199616 34439168 
480 6430720 27127808 201281536 34578432 
495 6430720 27127808 201334784 34615296 
510 6430720 27127808 201404416 34668544 
525 6434816 27127808 202153984 34553856 
540 6434816 27160576 202444800 34586624 
555 6434816 27160576 202563584 34582528 
570 6434816 27160576 202739712 34553856 
585 6434816 27160576 203059200 34082816 
600 6434816 27160576 203456512 34222080 


















0 0 32975,42693 0 26,12981 
15 0 32989,49535 0 26,12769 
30 0 32995,6414 0 26,15619 
45 0 32990,95946 0 0 
60 0 33020,15302 0 26,12841 
75 0 32998,22369 0 26,13134 
90 0 32994,28219 0 26,12858 
105 0 32994,03778 0 0 
120 0 32995,1552 0 26,1305 
135 0 33029,44321 0 26,1563 
150 0 32992,45153 0 26,1289 
165 0 32994,13514 0 0 
180 0 32996,26607 0 26,12895 
195 0 32994,38022 0 10401,04 
210 0 32993,70462 0 8216,05 
225 0 33028,71905 0 0 
240 0 32991,24687 0 26,13036 
255 0 32994,18151 0 26,12705 
270 0 32992,41311 0 26,12991 
285 0 32991,94356 0 0 
300 0 33017,80873 0 26,1272 
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315 0 32997,04512 0 26,1575 
330 0 32992,90586 0 26,12799 
345 0 32993,90398 0 0 
360 0 33029,36621 0 26,12837 
375 0 32991,05814 0 26,12847 
390 0 32989,83306 0 26,12931 
405 0 32988,37765 0 0 
420 19996.38894223225 33029,41666 0 26,12808 
435 0 32991,82833 0 26,12246 
450 0 32996,1104 0 26,12761 
465 0 32995,32345 0 0 
480 0 32990,73431 0 26,12059 
495 0 33029,29187 0 26,12263 
510 0 32992,53365 0 26,15629 
525 0 32992,0727 0 0 
540 0 32996,34358 0 26,12857 
555 0 31894,7782 0 26,1297 
570 0 32994,78691 0 26,12914 
585 0 33028,74162 0 0 
600 0 31879,60791 0 26,12857 


















0 0 0 232,4958638 41,32777 
15 0 0 0 41,32441 
30 0 0 11,53202811 41,36949 
45 0 0 0 0 
60 0 0 232,2403252 7139,722 
75 0 0 0 41,33019 
90 0 0 11,54398109 41,32581 
105 0.93391977286806083 0 0 0 
120 0 0 232,3069051 41,32885 
135 0 0 0 41,36966 
150 0.4666954810250924 0 11,53119748 41,32633 
165 0 0 0 0 
180 0 0 232,3104496 41,3264 
195 0 0 0 8325,097 
210 0 0 11,54467875 41,32286 
225 0 0 0 6105,916 
240 0 0 232,2477808 41,32863 
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255 0 0 0 41,3234 
270 0 0 11,46516045 41,32792 
285 0 0 0 0 
300 0 0 232,2971207 41,32363 
315 0 0 0 41,37156 
330 0 0 11,54478154 41,32488 
345 0 0 0 0 
360 0 0 232,1988011 41,32549 
375 0 0 0 41,32563 
390 0 0 11,53191652 41,32697 
405 0 0 0 0 
420 8.137832580400076 0 232,30427 41,32503 
435 0 0 0 41,31613 
450 0 0 11,46537428 41,32429 
465 0 0 0 0 
480 0 0 232,24399 41,31318 
495 0 0 0 41,31641 
510 0 0 11,53173409 376,4637 
525 0 0 0 0 
540 0 0 232,5482243 41,32579 
555 0 0 0 41,32759 
570 0 0 11,5320427 41,3267 
585 0 0 0 0 
600 0 0 232,3068957 41,32581 




Appendix B: OSSEC configuration 
  <!-- OSSEC-HIDS Win32 Agent Configuration. 
  -  This file is composed of 3 main sections: 
  -    - Client config - Settings to connect to the OSSEC server 
  -    - Localfile     - Files/Event logs to monitor 
  -    - syscheck      - System file/Registry entries to monitor 
  --> 
 
<!-- READ ME FIRST. If you are configuring OSSEC-HIDS for the 
first time, 
  -  try to use the "Manage_Agent" tool. Go to Control Panel-
>OSSEC Agent 
  -  to execute it. 
  - 
  -  First, add a server-ip entry with the real IP of your 
server. 
  -  Second, and optionally, change the settings of the files 
you want 
  -          to monitor. Look at our Manual and FAQ for more 
information. 
  -  Third, start the Agent and enjoy. 
  - 
  -  Example of server-ip: 
  -  <client> <server-ip>1.2.3.4</server-ip> </client> 




  <!-- One entry for each file/Event log to monitor. --> 
  <localfile> 
    <location>Application</location> 
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    <log_format>eventlog</log_format> 
  </localfile> 
 
  <localfile> 
    <location>Security</location> 
    <log_format>eventlog</log_format> 
  </localfile> 
 
  <localfile> 
    <location>System</location> 
    <log_format>eventlog</log_format> 
  </localfile> 
   
  <localfile> 
    <location>Windows PowerShell</location> 
    <log_format>eventlog</log_format> 
  </localfile> 
 
  <!-- Rootcheck - Policy monitor config --> 
  <rootcheck> 
    <windows_audit>./shared/win_audit_rcl.txt</windows_audit> 
    
<windows_apps>./shared/win_applications_rcl.txt</windows_apps> 
    
<windows_malware>./shared/win_malware_rcl.txt</windows_malware> 
  </rootcheck> 
 
   <!-- Syscheck - Integrity Checking config. --> 
  <syscheck> 
 




      -  on most systems and one a day should be enough. 
      --> 
    <frequency>60</frequency> 
 
    <!-- By default it is disabled. In the Install you must 
choose 
      -  to enable it. 
      --> 
    <disabled>no</disabled> 
 
    <!-- Default files to be monitored - system32 only. --> 
    <directories check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/win.ini</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/system.ini</directories> 
    <directories check_all="yes">C:\autoexec.bat</directories> 
    <directories check_all="yes">C:\config.sys</directories> 
    <directories check_all="yes">C:\boot.ini</directories> 
 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/at.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/attrib.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/cacls.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/cmd.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/drivers/etc</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/eventcreate.exe</directories> 




    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/lsass.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/net.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/net1.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/netsh.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/reg.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/regedt32.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/regsvr32.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/runas.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/sc.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/schtasks.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/sethc.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/subst.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/wbem/WMIC.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/SysNative/WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powers
hell.exe</directories> 





    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/CONFIG.NT</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/AUTOEXEC.NT</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/at.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/attrib.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/cacls.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/debug.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/drwatson.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/drwtsn32.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/edlin.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/eventcreate.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/eventtriggers.exe</directories
> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/ftp.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/net.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/net1.exe</directories> 




    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/rcp.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/reg.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/regedit.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/regedt32.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/regsvr32.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/rexec.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/rsh.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/runas.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/sc.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/subst.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/telnet.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/tftp.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/tlntsvr.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/drivers/etc</directories> 




    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powersh
ell.exe</directories> 
    <directories 
check_all="yes">%WINDIR%/System32/winrm.vbs</directories> 
 








    <!-- Windows registry entries to monitor. --> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\batfile</w
indows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\cmdfile</w
indows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\comfile</w
indows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\exefile</w
indows_registry> 





    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\AllFilesys
temObjects</windows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\Directory<
/windows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\Folder</wi
ndows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\Protocols<
/windows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies</windows_
registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Security</windows_registry> 




    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Se
rvices</windows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Co
ntrol\Session Manager\KnownDLLs</windows_registry> 






    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Run</windows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\RunOnce</windows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</windows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\URL</windows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Policies</windows_registry> 
    
<windows_registry>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</windows_registry> 








    <!-- Windows registry entries to ignore. --> 





    
<registry_ignore>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Security\SAM\Domains\Account
\Users</registry_ignore> 
    <registry_ignore type="sregex">\Enum$</registry_ignore> 
  </syscheck> 
 
  <active-response> 
    <disabled>yes</disabled> 




<!-- END of Default Configuration. --> 
 
 <ossec_config> 
   <client> 
      <server-ip>172.16.42.200</server-ip> 
   </client> 
 </ossec_config> 
